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JUDICIAL AVOIDANCE OF JURIES
IN MASS TORT LITIGATION
Peter H. Schuck*
The jury casts an immense shadow over mass tort litigation. On this
point, at least, all of the participants-plaintiffs' and defendants' law-
yers, their clients, jurors, judges, and commentators-seem to agree.'
Plaintiffs and their lawyers are probably the most ardent advocates
of the jury trial, at least in their public statements. They ostenta-
tiously maintain that they have total confidence in juries and want
nothing more than to get their cases before them. If they can only do
so, they assert, the jury will find the plaintiffs' grievous sufferings to be
compelling, their claims meritorious, and their corporate opponents
culpable, if not criminal. Plaintiffs' lawyers especially value juries in
mass tort litigation where, almost by definition, the compensatory
damages may be quite large. Although punitive damages are rare,2
especially in mass torts, they are always an alluring possibility to plain-
tiffs' lawyers, especially where incriminating corporate documents can
be unearthed and paraded before the jury. In a single stroke, then,
the mass tort jury can render justice to the plaintiffs and enrich their
lawyers.
Regardless of what plaintiffs' lawyers say in public, however, most
would strongly prefer to settle. After all, even the credible threat of a
jury trial can induce mass tort defendants to settle before trial,
thereby enabling plaintiffs to gain their judgments and the lawyers to
obtain their fees (and also to burnish their reputations in ways that
translate into greater bargaining power with future clients and defend-
ants) without incurring the high costs of trial and the substantial risks
of defendant verdicts or reversal on appeal.3
* Simeon E. Baldwin Professor, Yale Law School, and John Marshall Harlan Visiting Profes-
sor, New York Law School (Spring 1999). Kim DeMarchi, Yale Law School Class of 2000, pro-
vided fine research assistance.
1. Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80 CORNELL L. REV.
941, 977 (1995) (stating that trial lawyers, judges, and litigants tend to respect juror fact-finding,
which carries enormous normative force in American legal and political culture).
2. Michael L. Rustad, Unraveling Punitive Damages: Current Data and Further Inquiry, 1998
Wis. L. REV. 15.
3. Although good data on this question are lacking, defendants appear to be successful in
many, possibly even most, of the mass tort cases that go to trial. In this respect, asbestos cases in
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Defendants' lawyers also praise the institution of the civil jury.
Most defendants, one suspects, genuinely believe in the correctness of
their legal arguments and respect the intelligence and fairness of ju-
rors as factfinders. Moreover, they often succeed in persuading juries.
Nevertheless, most defendants in mass tort cases are as eager to avoid
a jury trial as plaintiffs say they are to have one. The reason is that
these defendants -confront the overriding, remorseless logic of the law
of small numbers. Even those that feel confident that juries will sup-
port their positions actually experience relatively few trials. As a re-
sult, the variability in trial outcomes-even assuming that the
underlying facts are identical-may be significant. 4 And because this
variability is linked to a tort system in which juries may award virtu-
ally unlimited damages, 5 most mass tort defendants can successfully
defeat almost every claim, yet still be threatened with bankruptcy if
even a single adverse jury decides to impose ruinous liability.6
Jurors are seldom heard from on the issue of how well they think
juries perform-or indeed on any other subject relating to their ser-
vice. Studies confirm what common experience teaches-that jurors
recent years constitute an exception. Plaintiffs, of course, have won victories at trial in many
other mass tort cases, especially those involving defective products such as DES, thalidomide,
and heart valves.
4. For a useful, but tendentious, explanation of this phenomenon, see Peter Huber, Junk Sci-
ence and the Jury, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 273.
5. This is primarily due to the intangible component of both compensatory and punitive dam-
ages and the lack of meaningful legal guidance or constraint for juries in assessing either type-
other than the prospect of post-trial remittitur or court-reduced judgments, procedures of which
jurors are presumably ignorant. See Kenneth S. Abraham, What is a Tort Claim?: An Intepreta-
tion of Contemporary Tort Reform, 51 Mo. L. REV. 172, 177-78 (1992) (noting that a successful
tort claimant is entitled to recover unlimited damages).
6. As Judge Richard Posner put it in rejecting a class certification:
They [defendants in mass tort cases] may not wish to roll these dice. That is putting it
mildly. They will be under intense pressure to settle.... Judge Friendly, who was not
given to hyperbole, called settlements induced by a small probability of an immense
judgment in a class action blackmail settlements.
In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995).
Posner's observation seems correct; it is difficult to find any other explanation for the willing-
ness of defendants to pay enormous sums-the breast implant and tobacco litigation are only the
most recent and dramatic examples-to settle claims with little scientific basis or subject to
strong legal defenses. The same can be said of the Agent Orange class action settlement to which
the defendant chemical companies agreed despite the court's findings, affirmed in this respect by
the appellate court, that both their factual defenses (on causation) and their legal defenses (e.g.,
the government contract defense) were not merely strong but dispositive. See PETER H.
SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS Toxic DISASTERS IN THE COURTS (enlarged ed.,
1987). Although the $180 million settlement amount, approved in 1984, seems trifling compared
to the settlement amounts proposed in recent years, it was the largest mass tort settlement up to
that time.
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overwhelmingly take pride and satisfaction in the experience. 7 Even
so, mass tort trials tend to be very protracted, tedious, and technical,
and it would therefore be surprising indeed if jurors in many cases did
not share the view of some legal commentators that lay juries cannot
comprehend such cases, much less fairly and reasonably decide them.8
The fact that other fact-finding entities may be no better at the task, of
course, does not necessarily mean that these doubts about jury compe-
tence are unfounded.
Judges, when asked publicly for their assessment, almost invariably
extol the virtues of juries.9 Nevertheless, judges admit to deep con-
cerns about the long delays, crowded dockets, and high transaction
costs of mass tort litigation. They are also concerned about the
problems for courts and litigants occasioned by the large number of
related claims in mass torts-the inconsistent verdicts; the first-come,
first-served distribution of the often inadequate resources available
for compensation; the legal uncertainties; the daunting procedural re-
quirements; the compromise of individual rights; the unfairness of
bundling together strong, weak, and frivolous claims; and the unusual
administrative demands that they impose.10
However genuine the judicial assurances of confidence in the civil
jury system may be, a more striking fact is that they have devised re-
markably effective ways to keep mass tort cases away from juries.11
My comments will elaborate on this theme of judicial jury avoidance.
Specifically, I wish to touch on four aspects of this phenomenon: (1)
the infrequency of jury trials; (2) the judicial motives for jury avoid-
ance; (3) the judicial techniques of jury avoidance; and (4) the possi-
7. Shari S. Diamond, What Jurors Think, in VERDI=r; ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM
282, 285-86 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993) (discussing studies that indicate jurors report a favorable
attitude toward jury duty after serving).
8. Dan Drazen, The Case for Special Juries in Toxic Tort Litigation, 72 JUDICATURE 292, 294
(1989) (arguing that toxic tort litigation is too complex for lay jurors); see The Jury's Capacity to
Decide Complex Civil Cases, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (1997).
9. E.g., Paula L. Hannaford et al., How Judges View Civil Juries, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 247, 248-
52 (1999). Thomas Munsterman and Nancy King noted at the Clifford Symposium many judges'
markedly paternalistic attitudes toward "their" juries.
My own impression, formed through confidential conversations with mass tort judges, is that
their private views of juries are often more critical than they are prepared to state publicly. This
impression may or may not be inconsistent with the upbeat survey data, depending on whether
judges responding to surveys consider their responses "public" in a sense, even when they will be
treated as anonymous.
10. The Agent Orange litigation vividly illustrates all of these difficulties. See SCHUCK, supra
note 6.
11. In doing so, of course, they are in a sense pushing against an open door, given the incen-




bility of a "complexity exception" to the right to a jury trial in mass
tort cases. Needless to say, there is a great deal more to be said on
each of these points than I can discuss in these brief comments.
Before turning to this discussion, however, let me frame it with a
few preliminary observations designed to narrow somewhat the focus
on mass torts. First, it is important for some purposes to distinguish
three types of mass tort cases: accidents (e.g., airline crashes); prod-
uct-related injuries (e.g., silicone gel breast implants); and toxic sub-
stance-related injuries (e.g., asbestos). I am concerned here with the
second and third types, which sometimes overlap as when the toxic
substance is contained in a consumer or industrial product-for exam-
ple, asbestos in automobile brake linings. Second, I am primarily con-
cerned here with the issues of general and specific causation.
Although mass tort disputes usually involve many other complex
legal and factual issues as well, such as product identification, deter-
mining causation is the problem that most strongly impels the courts'
jury avoidance efforts. Finally, the discussion is necessarily specula-
tive and impressionistic. I am unaware of any rigorous studies of a
significant sample of mass tort cases, as distinguished from the few
detailed case studies that have been published on particular mass tort
disputes such as Agent Orange,12 Bendectin, 13 Dalkon Shield,1 4 Buf-
falo Creek,' 5 and the Woburn toxic dump16 cases. Asbestos, the mass
tort in which the largest number of individual claims have actually
gone to trial, is probably the most jurisdictionally fragmented, fact-
specific, and differentially lawyered of them all, making it also the one
that is most resistant to systematic analysis and generalization.
I. THE INFREQUENCY OF MASS TORT JURY TRIALS
The vast majority of mass tort claims never reach a jury, as they are
either dropped or settled.17 This is hardly surprising; approximately
95% of all tort cases are resolved short of trial.' 8 If anything, mass
12. SCHUCK, supra note 6.
13. MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF MASS
Toxic SUBSTANCES LITIGATION (1996).
14. RICHARD B. SoBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD BANK-
RUPTCY (1991).
15. KAI ERIKSON, EVERYTHING IN ITS PATH: DESTRUCTION OF COMMUNITY IN THE BUFFALO
CREEK FLOOD (1976); GERALD M. STERN, THE BUFFALO CREEK DISASTER (1976).
16. JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1995).
17. According to a communication with the author from Deborah Hensler, Director of the
Institute for Civil Justice, RAND, in May 1998, it appears that there are no data on the propor-
tion of mass tort cases, as distinct from other kinds of cases, that go to trial.
18. Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, Most Cases Settle: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Set-
tlement, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1340 (1994) (citing Herbert Kritzer, Adjudication to Settlement:
[Vol. 48:479
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tort claims probably result in some payment to plaintiffs more often
than in other tort cases because of the relatively comprehensive
("global") nature of the settlements reached in some of the most im-
portant mass tort litigations.19
Whatever the militant public rhetoric deployed by mass tort liti-
gants might suggest, their lawyers are seldom eager to go to trial, as
noted earlier. 20 It is easy to understand why. Trying a mass tort case
is notoriously costly, especially in the early stages of the tort's evolu-
tion.21 Unless and until the tort "matures," the essential facts underly-
ing the complex questions of general causation, liability, and damages
are not firmly established, the most important legal issues have not
been authoritatively resolved by the appellate courts, the lawyers have
neither tested their mettle nor routinized the litigation, and thus
claim values are still unsettled. 22
In addition to the costs of trying such cases, the stakes for both sides
are likely to be high. The defendants not only face a large number of
current claims for already manifested injuries. Defendants may also
be vulnerable to a flood of future claims for injuries that are not yet
manifest, depending on the product distribution and consumer expo-
sure patterns, latency periods, plaintiffs' bar aggressiveness, and other
factors. If defendants can avoid a decisive defeat in the early cases,
they can hope to dig in for a long, costly war of attrition that will
discourage the plaintiffs' lawyers, induce settlement of current claims,
and stave off the filing and prosecution of new ones.23 If instead they
go to trial in an early case and lose, they will almost certainly be del-
uged with a flood of new claims generated by plaintiffs' lawyers drawn
by the smell of blood.24 By the same token, and for much the same
Shading in the Gray, 70 JUDICATURE 161, 163-64 (1986)) (stating that in an analysis of 1,649
cases in five federal circuits and seven state courts, only 7% of cases went to trial and reached a
jury verdict or court decision); see Michael Saks, Do We Know Anything About the Behavior of
the Litigation System and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992).
19. See Schuck, supra note 1, at 987.
20. See supra text accompanying notes 3-6.
21. E.g., JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., VARIATIONS IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION COMPENSATION
AND EXPENSES (Institute for Civil Justice, RAND Corp., No. R-3132-ICJ, 1984).
22. Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659 (1989);
Schuck, supra note 1, at 948-62.
23. This was the pattern of tobacco litigation until 1997 when the unprecedented and unex-
pected agreement between the industry, states, and plaintiffs' lawyers dramatically altered the
situation. Gary T. Schwartz, Tobacco Liability in the Courts, in SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS
AND CULTURE 131 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 1993). In the wake of the
collapse of that agreement and some new legal and political developments favorable to the in-
dustry's position, the states' claims were settled on terms much more favorable to the industry.




reason, plaintiffs' lawyers are reluctant to precipitate an early test of
strength that they might lose, although a trial-with all of the attend-
ant risks-is sometimes the only way in which they can hope to
weaken defendants' future litigation prospects and bring them to the
bargaining table.
The parties' difficulties in making these calculations are com-
pounded by the high variability of outcomes in many mass tort jury
trials. In the Brooklyn Navy Yard asbestos cases, for example, Judge
Jack Weinstein noted a great deal of variation among the damage
awards received by different plaintiffs with similar injuries and demo-
graphic characteristics. Judge Weinstein also found unwarranted vari-
ability in the outcomes of some of his repetitive stress keyboard
cases, 25 although his sample was of course very small relative to that in
the asbestos litigation. Indeed, so troubled was he by this variability
that he developed a grid to guide future juries.26
Conceivably, much or all of this variation (or some substantial frac-
tion of it) might be due to factual differences in the claims-for exam-
ple, the circumstances surrounding the injury-that a jury may
legitimately consider in assessing culpability and damages. Empirical
studies of jury performance in more conventional litigation suggest
that most of the variation can indeed be explained in this way.27 It is
much harder, however, to justify variable outcomes in cases where the
identical factual issue-lack of general causation-is (or at least should
be) dispositive of all of them, yet mass tort cases often violate the
basic principles of system rationality and horizontal equity. In the
Bendectin litigation, for example, a series of directed verdicts for de-
fendants based on lack of general causation was both bracketed and
interrupted by several large plaintiffs' verdicts.28 Similarly, in the sili-
cone gel breast implant litigation, where the evidence on general cau-
sation of immunological disorders was always weak and became
progressively weaker over time, most of the juries rendered defend-
25. Geressy v. Digital Equip. Corp., 980 F. Supp. 640, 660-74 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
26. Id. at 664-74.
27. 'Shari S. Diamond et al., Juror Judgments about Liability Damages: Sources of Variability
and Ways to Increase Consistency, 48 DEPAUL L. REv. 301 (1999).
28. See, e.g., Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 897 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (reversing
$95,000,000 verdict); Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (af-
firming district court's grant ofj.n.o.v on $1,000,000 verdict); Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., v. Hav-
ner, 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1997) (reversing $33,750,000 verdict); Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,
Inc., 560 A.2d 212 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (affirming $19,200,000 verdict), affld, 626 A.2d 537 (Pa.
1993); Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 506 A.2d 1100 (D.C. App. Ct. 1986) (reversing
trial court's grant ofj.n.o.v. on $750,000 verdict).
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ants' verdicts, but some of them awarded large damages to plaintiffs,
even after a string of defendant victories.2 9
This variability in outcomes for cases that appear similar on their
facts or that implicate identical dispositive legal principles or facts
should trouble any system of justice that aspires to rationality, fair-
ness, and predictability. It is especially regrettable when the different
outcomes appear to reflect differences in the lawyer's skill, or in the
location of the court, which is common in tort law generally. This
variability also engenders great uncertainty for the parties, but espe-
cially for defendants. Whether or not the variation is warranted by
different underlying facts, a defendant facing the risk not merely of an
adverse outcome, but of a truly catastrophic one,30 is likely to be
highly risk averse,31 preferring even a bad settlement to a precedent-
setting trial unless it is almost certain that it can prevail at trial. Yet,
such confidence is impossible given this variability, whatever its
source.
If the plaintiffs' lawyers feel confident of a favorable jury verdict, of
course, they will not acquiesce in the defendants' risk-averse strategy.
This confidence may be justified or may instead be born of myopia
and wishful thinking. But even if the plaintiffs' lawyers are less confi-
dent than this, they are more likely than defendants to press for trial.
They usually have less to lose from a defeat in an early case than de-
fendants do; unlike defendants, plaintiffs' lawyers can usually keep
bringing new cases until they win one, as collateral estoppel has little
application in such cases.32 Moreover, their power to extract a
favorable settlement from defendants may depend not only on the
strength of their underlying case but also on whether their threat to go
to trial is credible. Unless they are well-financed (and perhaps even
then), plaintiffs' lawyers are usually under severe economic pressures
to resolve cases quickly.
These incentives contrast sharply with those of defendants, who
tend to benefit from delay, for at least three reasons. They continue
to enjoy the investment value of the money during the period that
they retain it. They hope to wear down the other side by exploiting its
29. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. Mahlum, Civ. No. 28,600 (2d Dist. Nev. Nov. 7, 1995) (re-
turning a verdict of $12 million); Gina Kolata, Panel Can't Link Breast Implants to Any Diseases,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1998, at Al.
30. Statistically, such a situation exists when the mean outcome promises to be far higher than
the median one.
31. This, of course, is precisely the kind of situation to which Judge Posner refers in the pas-
sage cited earlier. See Abraham, supra note 5.
32. Michael D. Green, The Inability of Offensive Collateral Estoppel to Fulfill its Promise: An
Examination of Estoppel in Asbestos Litigation, 70 IowA L. REV. 141 (1994).
1998]
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need for immediate cash. Finally, they hope that new scientific evi-
dence will over time weaken plaintiffs' causation claims, as has been
the pattern with a number of mass torts including Agent Orange,
Bendectin, breast implants, asbestos in buildings, and perhaps repeti-
tive stress keyboard injuries. Defendants' optimal strategy, then, is to
communicate an adamant unwillingness to settle, at least until they
are "on the courthouse steps" where so many disputes are ultimately
resolved.
Defendants' incentives often diverge from those of their outside
counsel, who have traditionally billed their clients by the hour and
thus tend to benefit financially from protracted litigation rather than
early settlement. 33 Many corporate clients, increasingly conscious of
and concerned about these conflicts of interest and about their ability
to monitor their lawyers effectively, have begun to adopt more strin-
gent controls and more efficient incentives, including greater use of in-
house counsel and alternative forms of compensation for their outside
lawyers. Moreover, judges have devised techniques for circumventing
the lawyers and communicating directly with the clients and their in-
surers-for example, inviting them to attend the trial and speaking to
them in chambers about how they view the dispute. The parties' law-
yers are sometimes present when these communications occur, some-
times not (although the court will almost surely inform them about
what transpired).
For these reasons (and perhaps others), the well-known Priest-Klein
model of litgation behavior,34 which predicts that the cases in which
outcomes are most uncertain are precisely the ones most likely to go
to trial rather than settle, seems inaccurate as a general account of
mass tort litigation. The asymmetric incentives and the risk aversion
exhibited by mass tort plaintiffs (and their lawyers) and by mass tort
defendants evidently exert a powerful gravitational pull away from tri-
als and toward settlement despite-or perhaps because of-the enor-
mous legal, factual, and procedural uncertainties surrounding these
33. I do not mean to suggest that this financial self-interest is the only, or even the primary,
motive animating defense lawyers, who are presumably as scrupulous about their duties toward
their clients (and to the court) as any fiduciaries confronted with such conflicts.
34. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STuD. 1 (1984). This important article has spawned a significant, often critical literature.
See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background
on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1995); Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection
Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337 (1990).
[Vol. 48:479
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cases. Many judges both exploit and magnify this incentive-driven
tendency toward settlement.35
II. THE JUDICIAL MOTIVES FOR AVOIDING JURY TRIALS
In a sense, there is little to explain about judges' desires to avoid
mass tort trials. They almost always seek to avoid trials, whether mass
tort or not, by encouraging settlements, and their reasons for doing so
apply at least as strongly to mass tort cases as to other kinds of litiga-
tion. I shall not enter into the largely academic debate over whether
genuinely consensual settlements of large-scale litigation are socially
desirable or whether-as my colleague Owen Fiss believes,36 and I do
not 37-the social interest in elaborating public values makes even con-
sensual settlements undesirable. Suffice it to say that trial judges be-
have as if they were convinced that settlement in mass tort cases is
generally not only desirable but imperative.
As I discuss below, recent decisions by the Supreme Court and the
federal appellate courts limiting certain uses of some claims aggrega-
tion techniques, particularly litigation class actions,38 settlement class
actions,39 and multi-district litigation ("MDL"), 40 have complicated
trial courts' efforts to settle mass tort litigation.41 In this section, then,
I shall focus on the distinctive features of mass torts that reinforce this
already powerful judicial inclination to settle such cases short of trial.
Beyond judges' concerns about the frequent irrationality and dis-
parity of mass tort verdicts discussed above, the most important rea-
son why they prefer to settle cases is their growing concern over
lengthening court dockets.42 Naturally enough, judges wish to con-
serve their scarce trial time for those cases that simply cannot be set-
tled. For this reason alone, they view with some alarm the prospect of
35. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Or-
ange Example, 53 U. CH. L. REV. 337 (1986) (analyzing the judge's role in settling complex civil
cases like Agent Orange cases).
36. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) (arguing that because consent
is often coerced and bargaining is done without authority, settlement is a highly problematic
technique for streamlining dockets, which often results in injustice).
37. Schuck, supra note 1, at 961.
38. Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996); In re American Med. Sys.,
Inc., 75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996).
39. E.g., Amchen Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997); In re General Motors Corp.
Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 818-19 (3d Cir. 1995).
40. Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach, 118 S. Ct. 956 (1998).
41. I say "complicated" rather than "blocked" because while these decisions ostensibly make
global settlements more difficult, the decisions may in other respects tend to encourage settle-
ments, and it is not at all clear how settlement on balance will be affected.
42. See, e.g., William W. Schwarzer, Settlement of Mass Tort Class Actions: Order Out of
Chaos, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 837 (1995).
1998]
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trying any case that may take months or even years to try, consuming
much of the court's administrative resources in the process as well.
Obviously, this implies an even greater concern about mass tort litiga-
tion, which has particularly large docket-clogging implications. This
motive to conserve resources increasingly coincides with a bureau-
cratic one. Mass torts began to strain judicial dockets during the late
1970s and early 1980s when asbestos claims proliferated, and they
have accelerated ever since. At the same time a combination of appel-
late court superiors, legislative directives, and court administrators
pressed judges to process and complete more cases more quickly.
Congress institutionalized this pressure at the federal level by enacting
the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990,43 requiring the courts to develop
procedures for expeditiously resolving cases. Mass torts were the 800-
pound gorillas that demanded immediate attention, for they
threatened to wreak havoc not only on court dockets but also on the
judges' own performance ratings.
Mass tort litigation is also notoriously difficult to organize for trial.
Jurors must be found who can serve through what may be a very pro-
tracted proceeding, which means that these jurors are often demo-
graphically atypical. Where multiple defendants are involved, as is
often the case in mass torts, the sheer number of lawyers whose activi-
ties must be accommodated and coordinated can be daunting. Be-
cause of the many novel legal issues, opportunities for judicial error
abound and interlocutory appeals can cause further delay and confu-
sion. The economic stakes to lawyers in managing mass tort litigation
are so high that the court must constantly supervise and control their
famously aggressive conduct. In class or consolidated actions, choice
of law issues and other differences among the plaintiffs concerning the
level of their exposures and the timing and nature of their claims may
necessitate the establishment of subclasses. 44 Such differences also
limit the court's ability to use collateral estoppel and issue preclusion
to reduce the number of trials.45 In federal court diversity cases,
judges must often apply unfamiliar and dynamic state tort doctrines. 46
The prospect of bankruptcies, which have been common among mass
43. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (1997).
44. This is especially likely after the Supreme Court's decision in Amchen Products, 117 S. Ct.
2231, but it was true even before Amchen Products. See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos
Litig., 982 F.2d 721, 739-45 (2d Cir. 1992).
45. Green, supra note 32, at 197.
46. This encourages them to render what Chief Judge Richard Posner has called a "kind of
Esperanto instruction" to the jury. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300 (7th Cir.
1995).
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tort defendants,47 further complicate both the legal issues and the liti-
gation process. Because massive documentation and complex scien-
tific evidence are endemic in mass tort cases, courts must often
appoint special masters to supervise their production.48 Other unu-
sual measures are also necessary to enable the jurors to retrieve and
comprehend the evidence.
Fairly early in the evolution of mass tort litigation, some controver-
sial judicial decisions reinforced the willingness and authority of trial
courts to avoid jury trials despite the existence of what many observ-
ers viewed as material issues of fact. In the Agent Orange opt-out
cases, Judge Weinstein granted summary judgment for the defendants
on the general causation issue despite the proffer by plaintiffs of testi-
mony purporting to support their factual claims, a ruling that was af-
firmed by the Second Circuit on other grounds.4 9 Similarly, in several
early Bendectin cases, appellate courts nipped the litigation in the bud
by dismissing plaintiffs' general causation arguments as a matter of
law.50 Such decisions were designed not only to facilitate the dismissal
of existing claims but also to foreclose the flood of marginal or spuri-
ous new claims that often follow in the wake of class certifications,
plaintiffs' verdicts, and favorable settlements. They surely embold-
ened subsequent courts to be more aggressive in preventing what they
regarded as weak cases from proceeding to trial.
This judicial aggressiveness in policing doubtful claims was rein-
forced by the increasingly strident denunciations by a number of com-
mentators of "junk science in the courtroom." These critiques became
commonplace by 199051 and seemed only to increase the courts' skep-
ticism about plaintiffs' scientific claims. Growing concerns about the
quality of the scientific evidence that typically underlies mass tort
cases surely help to explain the Supreme Court's recent insistence that
47. The asbestos litigation helped precipitate some bankruptcies among many manufacturers.
See Peter H. Schuck, The Worst Should Go First: Deferral Registries in Asbestos Litigation, 15
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 541, 555 (1992). A.H. Robins Co. filed for bankruptcy in the Dalkon
Shield litigation. See SOBOL, supra note 14. Dow Corning filed for bankruptcy in the silicone gel
breast implant litigation. In re Dow Coming Corp., No. 95-20512, 1995 WL 49597, at *3 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. Aug. 9, 1995).
48. E.g., Wayne D. Brazil, Special Masters in Complex Cases: Extending the Judiciary or Re-
shaping Litigation, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 394, 394-98 (1986).
49. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1260 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), affd on
other grounds, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987).
50. Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1361 (6th Cir. 1992); Christopher v.
Allied-Signal Corp., 902 F.2d 362, 368 (5th Cir. 1990).
51. E.g., PETER HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991);




the trial courts function as more demanding gatekeepers in reviewing
this evidence 52 and that the appellate courts broadly defer to those
gatekeeping decisions.53 These rulings tend to favor mass tort
defendants.
III. THE TECHNIQUES OF JURY AVOIDANCE
Courts avoid jury trials in mass tort cases in two standard ways.
They decide dispositive motions (i.e., motions to dismiss, for summary
judgment, and for directed verdict) in favor of defendants, 54 and they
facilitate or approve negotiated settlements. (I know of no mass tort
case in which plaintiffs chose a bench trial). The techniques through
which they produce these outcomes, however, are more varied and to
some extent overlapping. I shall briefly discuss four of them: forceful
judicial management of litigation, exploitation of uncertainty, deci-
sions on class action issues, and categorical exclusions of certain kinds
of scientific evidence.
A. Judicial Management
In no area of litigation is managerial judging55 more obvious and
central than in mass torts.56 Judges can shape the sequence and char-
acter of the discovery process in order to identify and focus certain
issues that might be dispositive before trial, such as general causation,
statute of limitations, or the government contractor defense. They can
"polyfurcate" and sequence the trial so that certain issues will be re-
solved before others, which can confer on one party or another a tacti-
cal advantage that may help to induce settlement.5 7 Judges can also
nudge the parties into settlement discussions by signaling how the
court is inclined to decide crucial issues (e.g., choice of law, punitive
damages, market share liability, insurer good faith), or by organizing
the litigation so as to help clarify claims values at a relatively early
stage through the use of representative plaintiffs, bellwether cases,
mini-trials, or other forms of what Professor Robert Bone has called
52. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
53. General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512, 514 (1997).
54. The Supreme Court has pressed the lower courts to grant summary judgment more liber-
ally, including in mass tort cases. See Celotex Corp. v. Carrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
55. The canonical article is Judith Resnik, Managerial Judging, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376 (1982).
For subsequent evolution in this area, see Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation," LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1991, at 5.
56. Schuck, supra note 1, at 956-58.
57. See, e.g., In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 307 (6th Cir. 1988) (trifurcation); see Ken-
neth S. Bordens & Irwin A. Horowitz, Mass Tort Civil Litigation: The Impact of Procedural
Changes on Jury Decisions, 73 JUDICATURE 22 (1989).
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"statistical adjudication, ' 58 methods that lend themselves to extrapo-
lating values from a small number of claims to a much larger set.59 In
this way, one or a few early jury trials may obviate the need for others,
even given the limited applicability of collateral estoppel in mass
torts.60 By all accounts, however, the most effective way for judges to
accelerate settlement discussions is to set an early trial date and then
doggedly adhere to it, a tactic that sharply focuses the parties' minds,
clarifies their stakes, and makes lawyers' delaying tactics both less
credible and more costly.61
Not surprisingly, mass torts have attracted a number of unusually
strong-willed state and federal judges. Although mass torts are
predominantly a state court phenomenon, certain federal trial
judges-for example, Jack Weinstein, Robert Merhige, Tom Lambros,
Sam Pointer, Carl Rubin, and Robert Parker-are the jurists most
strongly associated with these disputes.62 These judges have domi-
nated the field almost since its inception, often jockeying to gain con-
trol of the most challenging and notorious cases. Each of them has
employed a broad range of managerial tactics in order to shape the
litigation so as to discourage weak claims, avoid jury trials, and forge
settlements.
The use of special masters in mass tort litigation must be viewed in
this light. The enormous size and complexity of these cases impose
substantial resource demands on the courts.63 Most trial judges have
responded by appointing special masters who can provide them with
procedural flexibility, multiple channels of communication with the
parties, and other administrative resources that can be used to expe-
dite the litigation, clarify issues and claim values, and facilitate settle-
58. Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a World of Process
Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REv. 561, 563 (1993).
59. Schuck, supra note 1, at 958-60.
60. See Green, supra note 32.
61. Judge Weinstein jolted the lawyers with an early trial date in the Agent Orange litigation,
SCHUCK, supra note 6, at 113, 118-19, but its effects on settlement negotiations in all cases are
well-understood by even novice trial judges.
62. The greater prominence of federal judges than their state court counterparts is by no
means limited to mass tort litigation. However, it is regrettable and especially misleading in this
area where most cases-more than two-thirds of the asbestos cases, for example-are litigated in
the state courts, the administrative resources available to the state judges are invariably more
limited, and the state law rules-on class actions and damages, for example-often differ signifi-
cantly from the federal rules.
63. The judicial resources required by the Agent Orange litigation, the first of its kind, were
staggering, SCHUCK, supra note 6, at 4-5, but it was ultimately litigated and settled largely as a
single, consolidated case. Partly for this reason, the fragmented asbestos litigation has de-
manded far more of the courts. This was readily apparent early on. Report of the Judicial
Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation (Mar. 1991).
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ment negotiations. 64 Indeed, Judge Weinstein actually used six special
masters in the Agent Orange case, four or five of them simultane-
ously. 65 Courts use special masters, among other things, to coordinate
and manage discovery, investigate special facts relevant to a judge's
decision, 66 mediate among the lawyers, broker settlement negotia-
tions, determine attorneys fee awards and costs, and design and ad-
minister techniques to process and evaluate claims and to distribute
settlement funds.67
Artfully deploying their special masters, mass tort judges have
sometimes used what might be called strong-arm tactics in order to
pressure lawyers into reaching agreement in cases that might other-
wise have gone to trial. This was apparently true, for example, of
Judge Merhige in the Dalkon Shield litigation, 68 Judge Weinstein in
the Agent Orange case,69 and Judge Samuel Skinner in the Woburn
toxic dump case. 70
B. Uncertainty
Even more than other areas of litigation, mass torts are pervaded by
uncertainty. This uncertainty reflects a number of factors. A rela-
tively new genre of litigation, it involves many novel and complex
questions of fact, substantive law, procedure, remedies, evidence, in-
surance, legal ethics, and other diverse fields that are difficult for the
courts and counsel to master and effectively integrate. As we have
seen, the great variability in jury verdicts in mass tort cases com-
pounds the other risks of proceeding to trial, while the prospect of
uncontrollable transaction costs magnifies the uncertainty not only for
the immediate parties and their lawyers but also for insurers, who
have greater incentives to deny liability under existing policies when
mass tort defendants demand that the carriers undertake their
defense. 71
64. Brazil, supra note 48, at 396-97.
65. SCHUCK, supra note 6, at 5.
66. For example, special masters have sometimes been used to determine defendants' sol-
vency, which helped to guide the judges' decisions about whether the preconditions for the use
of a mandatory class action were satisfied. Marvin Frankel, a former federal judge, performed
this function for Judge Weinstein in the asbestos litigation.
67. The most prominent practitioners of these arts are Francis McGovern and Kenneth Fein-
berg, who have performed as special masters in many of the leading mass tort litigations.
68. SOBOL, supra note 14.
69. SCHUCK, supra note 6.
70. HARR, supra note 16.
71. Disputes between corporate defendants and their insurance carriers over liability coverage
of mass tort claims have been common and protracted in the asbestos and silicone gel breast
implant litigations, among others. Green, supra note 32, at 160.
[Vol. 48:479
JUDICIAL AVOIDANCE OF JURIES
The two most significant wild cards in mass torts, however, are puni-
tive damages and future claims. Punitive damages, which vastly in-
crease the stakes in the outcome and thus prod risk-averse parties-
especially defendants-toward settlement, are possible in mass tort
cases, 72 if only because discovery may support an inference that de-
fendants knew (or had reason to know) about the serious risks that
they were creating for a large number of people, or even that they
actively concealed these risks.73 Together with the law's inadequate
guidance and constraint of the juries that may assess punitive dam-
ages, these factors magnify the unpredictability of outcomes and
hence the attractiveness of settlements.
Still, it is easy to exaggerate the actual significance of punitive dam-
ages.74 In fact, they are only rarely imposed, and even then they are
often reduced by trial judges or appellate courts. In the end, more-
over, many punitive damage awards do not actually get paid. For this
reason, courts sometimes sever the punitive damages portion of the
case and defer it indefinitely, by which time the dispute may be settled
or the punitive damages issue dropped. This does not mean that puni-
tive damages are irrelevant, but only that they are bargaining chips
that affect the settlement negotiations. 75
Future claims, which are of course far more common than punitive
damages, introduce immense uncertainties. It is simply impossible for
the parties, insurers, or the court to accurately predict how many fu-
ture claims will be filed;76 the number of future claims has often ex-
ceeded the expectations of even the plaintiffs' lawyers.77 Because of
the long and variable latency periods associated with many mass toxic
torts, it is also hard to predict when the future claims will be filed,
when the manifestation of injury will transform those future claims
into current claims for actual physical harms, and which harms those
72. Liability insurance policies usually do not cover punitive damages.
73. Such knowledge and concealment have been alleged in the tobacco, asbestos, and silicone
gel breast implant litigations, among others.
74. See Special Issue: The Future of Punitive Damages, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 1.
75. This tendency may be increased by recent amendments to the Internal Revenue Code that
make punitive damage awards in personal injury cases taxable to the recipient as income while
compensatory damages are not taxable. I.R.C. § 104 (1998).
76. Judge Jack R. Weinstein suggested during his remarks entitled The Future of Class Actions
in Mass Tort Cases: A Roundtable, presented at Fordham Law School on September 25, 1997,
that courts can use Rule 706(b) panels to help them estimate the parameters of future claims.
77. See SCHUCK, supra note 6, at 205-06. In the tobacco and breast implant litigations, this
underestimation was so large that it helped to undo the original global settlements. In global
settlements such as the one in the asbestos litigation invalidated in Amchen Products, Inc. v.
Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2251 (1997), defendants therefore insist on provisions enabling them to
opt-out in the event that the number of future claims exceeds certain levels. See Schuck, supra
note 1, at 967-68.
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transformed claims will allege. Such uncertainties are perhaps great-
est in the tobacco litigation because unlike almost all other mass torts,
cigarettes continue to be a legally sanctioned product. These claims,
therefore, may be filed not only by those who have been exposed but
are not yet manifesting illness; they may also be fied by those who
have not even been exposed yet but who will be exposed in the future
when they take up smoking.
The uncertainty surrounding future claims, however, is by no means
limited to the issues of the number, timing, and nature of such claims.
Predicting the strength, and hence the litigation value, of those claims
is also problematic. As a practical matter, all that the parties can do is
to extrapolate from current claims. This extrapolation, of course, as-
sumes that the pattern of future claims will mimic that of current
claims. For a number of reasons, however, future claims may be quite
different. Changes may occur in exposure patterns, the law, the sci-
ence, the known facts about defendants' conduct, claimant's expecta-
tions, and other litigation variables. If so, the decisions of juries will
also change, thereby affecting the lawyers' expectations and settle-
ment demands.
Judges in mass tort litigation have learned how to exploit these and
other sources of uncertainty strategically in order to encourage settle-
ments. By selectively deploying information and intimations about
the risks to each party's position that a jury trial would present, and by
making its own decisions tentative and contingent, the court can hope
to bring the parties closer together. In these ways, it may succeed in
using uncertainty, which some models of litigation view as an obstacle
to settlement,78 as a goad to settlement. Although such strategic judi-
cial behavior is not easy to document, I have shown how Judge Wein-
stein exhibited this pattern in fashioning a settlement in the Agent
Orange litigation. 79  There is every reason to believe that other
judges, equally eager to avoid a long jury trial, behave similarly.
C. Class Actions
Trial courts have often certified mass tort cases as class actions.80
Even before Amchen Products,81 however, appellate courts as often
78. Priest & Klein, supra note 34, at 4.
79. Schuck, supra note 35, at 343.
80. See discussion and examples in Helen E. Freedman, Class Actions for Mass Torts in State
Courts: A State Court Judge's Response to Professor Vairo, N.Y. LITIGATOR, May 1998, at 13.
81. 117 S. Ct. 2231. The Supreme Court recently heard oral arguments in another case chal-
lenging the certification of an asbestos class action. Ortiz v. Firbreboard Corp., 118 S. Ct. 2339
(1998).
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vacated or significantly modified these certifications. 82 In doing so,
they reaffirmed the strong misgivings about personal injury class ac-
tions originally expressed by the framers of Rule 23, misgivings that
the Supreme Court has now authoritatively embraced as doctrinal or-
thodoxy, at least in litigation as "sprawling" and heterogeneous as
asbestos.83
The eagerness of trial courts to certify class actions is not at all diffi-
cult to understand; it reflects the same reasons that incline them to
avoid juries and settle cases. Class actions minimize the risk of incon-
sistent jury verdicts. They are easier to organize (and, if necessary,
try) than a comparable number of claims litigated in individual ac-
tions.84 Perhaps most important, they are easier to settle than a multi-
tude of individual cases because class actions can bring all current and
future claims and all defendants before the court at one time and
place. Only this kind of comprehensive or "global" class action can
enable mass tort defendants to resolve these claims finally, com-
pletely, and (relatively) swiftly through dismissal, summary judgment,
or settlement. It alone can secure for them the certainty and peace for
which they seem willing to pay large premiums-even as to claims to
which they believe they have strong defenses. 85 In this respect, the
parties often86 view the class action not merely as a desirable mecha-
nism for settling mass tort claims, but as an indispensable one.
A trial court's jury avoidance strategy, then, is likely to center on
certifying mass tort claims as class actions in order to facilitate a set-
82. See, e.g., Richard Nagareda, In the Aftermath of the Mass Tort Class Action, 85 GEo. L.J.
295, 301-09 (1996) (noting that before Amchen Products that de-certifications had already been
ordered in litigation involving tobacco, prosthetic devices, and blood products). For other decer-
tifications, see Freedman, supra note 80.
83. Amchen Prods., Inc., 117 S. Ct. at 2251-52. After Amchen Products, some federal trial
courts took the initiative to decertify classes that they had previously certified and to refuse to
certify classes. See, e.g., Walker v. Liggett Group, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 226, 233 (S.D. W. Va. 1997);
Georgene M. Vairo, Amchen Products, Inc. v. Windsor: Where Will the Mass Tort Class Actions
Go?, N.Y. LrIGATOR, May 1998, at 6. Federal courts of appeals decertified many of those that
remained. Id. at 8 n.37. In the Ortiz case, now pending in the Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit
reaffirmed its class certification. In re Asbestos Litig., 134 F.3d 668 (5th Cir. 1998).
84. For dissenting views, see Richard A. Epstein, The Consolidation of Complex Litigation: A
Critical Evaluation of the ALl Proposal, 10 J.L. & COM. 1 (1990); Roger H. Transgrud, Mass
Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 69.
85. See supra note 6.
86. I use the qualifier "often" because a mass tort defendant's calculation of whether it would
be better off defending in a class action (which of course can take a variety of quite different
forms, even within a particular Rule 23 type) instead of in a large number of individual actions,
or in some non-class form that aggregates claims, is a complicated one that depends on a variety
of factors often cutting in different directions. The decision by a plaintiffs' lawyer as to whether
to seek class certification, and if so in which form, is similarly complicated.
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tlement that they will later 87 help to fashion. Because this inclination
is sure to survive Amchen Products, plaintiffs' lawyers may simply de-
cide to file their class actions in state courts instead.88 After all, some
state jurisdictions are now more receptive to mass tort class actions
than are the federal courts. State court actions, moreover, are likely
to exhibit fewer problems of choice of law and heterogeneity than are
federal courts. Finally, the Supreme Court's decisions in Phillips Pe-
troleum89 and Matsushita90 have accorded state courts considerable
latitude under the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit clauses to
adjudicate and settle class actions under their own rules.91
Whichever system entertains a class action, trial courts often go be-
yond class certification to determine how the class action will be man-
aged and hence who will be the key stakeholders and decisionmakers
on the plaintiffs' side. A judge's power to design the structure of the
plaintiffs' management group and designate its membership signifi-
cantly shapes the future course of a class action. Courts can exercise
much greater influence over this group than it generally exerts over
trial lawyers in non-class action cases. The courts' enhanced influence
arises both because class action judges usually assume a special
trustee-like responsibility to monitor the lawyers' performance on be-
half of the class members (who at this stage are largely anonymous
and even at later stages tend to be passive spectators), and because
the judges ultimately determine the amount of the counsel fees and
reimbursable costs, and their distribution among the plaintiffs'
lawyers.
Accordingly, the leading plaintiffs' lawyers compete fiercely to per-
suade the court to appoint them to the management group whose
members will eventually receive the great bulk of the fees. In select-
ing this group, the court must often choose between two types of law-
yers who tend to differ both in temperament and in their patterns of
87. In the case of settlement class actions, of course, the settlement occurs simultaneously
with the certification, not later. The viability of settlement class actions, however, has been
called into question by the Amchen Products decision, at least in the circumstances presented
there.
88. When Congress in 1995 amended the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (1995), to impose a
variety of new obstacles to maintaining securities class actions in the federal courts, the plaintiffs'
lawyers responded by filing their cases in state courts, where such limitations did not apply. As a
result, Congress recently enacted legislation that seeks to overcome these strategies by imposing
similar restrictions on such class actions in state courts. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards
Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227.
89. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
90. Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
91. For a discussion of New York's more conservative approach to class actions, see Freed-
man, supra note 80, at 14.
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legal practice. Trial specialists are eager to conduct discovery and go
before a jury to try the case if necessary. In contrast, class action spe-
cialists' main skills tend to lie elsewhere: in advertising to and assem-
bling a class, maximizing its size, deciding on subclasses, designing
effective class notice, supplying or obtaining the necessary financing,
working with local counsel, spinning the media, and negotiating settle-
ments with the defendants and their insurers. While courts often
place members from both camps on the management committee, they
seem to prefer the latter-in part, one supposes, because the court
thinks that they are more likely to reach a settlement that can avoid a
protracted jury trial, with all of its attendant costs and uncertainties
for the parties, their lawyers, and the system.
If class actions are not, strictly speaking, a necessary condition of
settlement of mass tort claims, the profusion of settlement class actions
prior to Amchen Products nonetheless strongly suggests that both
sides find them highly conducive to the negotiation and effectuation of
settlements.92 This is especially true of asbestos and other mass tort
litigation in which the claims' heterogeneity would otherwise gener-
ally preclude them from satisfying the commonality and certain other
requirements of Rule 2393 and its state law counterparts. But what is
perhaps more interesting and disturbing to the Supreme Court and
some lower appellate courts,94 as well as to some commentators, 95 is
the possibility that class actions are sufficient to induce settlements
because of the irresistible incentives that they create for both sides to
avoid trial. Plaintiffs' lawyers may be under great presssure to com-
promise the interests of some members of the class in order to benefit
other members-and themselves-through negotiated or court-
awarded counsel fees.96 As we have seen, mass tort defendants who
might be bankrupted by an adverse decision in the class action may
have little choice but to settle, almost without regard to the claims'
merits, precisely because they fear the pervasive uncertainty and the
variability of jury decisions in such cases.97 For these reasons, as well
as for the more conventional doctrinal reasons for doubting that Rule
92. Nagareda, supra note 82, at 309.
93. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
94. In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 784
(3d Cir. 1995); Nagareda, supra note 82, at 308.
95. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Derek P. Apanovitch, The Constitutional Limits of Judicial
Rulemaking: The Illegitimacy of Mass-Tort Settlements Negotiated Under Federal Rule 23, 39
ARMz. L. REV. 461 (1997); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class
Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343 (1995).
96. See, e.g., Amchen Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2251 (1997); Coffee, supra note
95, at 1384.
97. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995).
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23 applies to most mass toxic torts,98 some appellate courts have lim-
ited, and sometimes overruled, trial courts' determination to avoid
jury trials through class action settlements.99
D. Categorical Exclusions of Evidence
A fourth technique by which courts avoid jury trials in mass tort
litigation is their growing willingness to exclude certain types of plain-
tiffs' evidence from reaching the jury under the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence and in states that have adopted the gatekeeping approach
required by the Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.100
The problem arises primarily in the case of claims in which the
plaintiff complains of a "non-signature" disease like lung cancer that
could have more than one possible cause. Such diseases characterize
almost all mass tort injuries; the major apparent exceptions are asbes-
tosis and mesothelioma, which seem unique to asbestos exposure, and
the vaginal carcinoma that seems distinctive to DES exposure. In the
more common instance of a non-signature injury, the courts have
struggled to identify the appropriate scientific methodologies for as-
suring that any admissible evidence will be sufficiently reliable to sup-
port findings on the issues of general and specific causation. These
struggles have produced some blanket exclusions of evidentiary cate-
gories, which can then justify courts in using directed verdicts or mo-
tions for summary judgment in favor of defendants in order to avoid
jury trials. 10 1
The courts have taken a number of approaches to the question of
admissibility on the issue of causation, particularly general causation.
Sometimes flatly inconsistent, sometimes not, these approaches have
the effect of establishing that some mass tort cases will not reach the
jury because plaintiffs lack the kind of scientific evidence that can sat-
isfy the court's categorical standards of admissibility in such cases.
Most courts favor epidemiological evidence. 102 Because it involves
98. See, e.g., Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 740-52 (5th Cir. 1996); In re
American Med. Prods., 75 F.3d 1069, 1078-83 (6th Cir. 1996). In contrast, mass accident cases
such as airline disasters or fires can more easily satisfy Rule 23's requirements.
99. See Amchen Prods., Inc., 117 S. Ct. at 2252; General Motors, 55 F.3d at 818-19; Nagareda,
supra note 82. But see In re Asbestos Litig., 134 F.3d 668 (5th Cir. 1998).
100. 509 U.S. 579, 592-95 (1993).
101. In theory, a court in a mass tort case could grant a dispositive motion in favor of the
plaintiff, but I am unaware of any such case. Even with a signature disease like mesothelioma,
other issues such as product identification, adequate warning, or comparative fault are likely to
remain for the jury to decide.
102. In order for the epidemiological evidence to be admissible, of course, it is not sufficient
that the particular evidence be of the categorically favored type. In addition, it must satisfy the
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human populations, it does not suffer from many of the well-known
methodological limitations of animal studies,103 and unlike clinical evi-
dence, which ordinarily cannot distinguish among the various possible
causes of a non-signature disease, epidemiological evidence can (at
least in principle) isolate the causal contributions of those possible
causes by comparing the experiences of large, differentially exposed
populations, subject to appropriate controls.
Some courts, such as Judge Weinstein in his decision granting de-
fendants summary judgment in the Agent Orange opt-out cases,104
have ruled that only epidemiological evidence can prove causation in
such cases, which effectively denies many plaintiffs access to a jury. In
his view, "[a]ll the other data supplied by the parties rests on surmise
and inapposite extrapolations from animal studies and industrial acci-
dents"10 5 or on clinical evidence that, although identifying the pa-
tient's condition, could not demonstrate which of the possible causal
agents was responsible for it.106 For the same reason, the appellate
courts in the later, decisive stages of the Bendectin litigation also
ruled for defendants, holding that only epidemiological evidence
could prove general causation in such cases.10 7 More recently, some
other courts have taken similar positions categorically excluding non-
epidemiological evidence. 10 8
other judicial criteria of relevance, probity, and reliability that normally apply to such evidence.
See, e.g., Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1398 (D. Or. 1996) (requiring
epidemiological evidence, but also requiring, as courts typically do, that such evidence demon-
strate at least a doubling of the background risk before it can be admitted to prove general
causation under the conventional preponderance of the evidence standard); see Lopez v. Wyeth-
Ayerst Labs, No. 97-15143, 1998 WL 81296, at *2 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding analytical gap between
epidemiological and other studies and conclusions).
103. As is equally well known, of course, epidemiological studies suffer from their own dis-
tinctive limitations, especially the notorious difficulties of cost, of obtaining accurate exposure
data, and of controlling for all of the variables other than exposure to the agent in question that
might have affected the observed condition in the exposed population.
104. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1264 (D.C.N.Y. 1985).
105. Id. at 1231. For a partial critique of Judge Weinstein's approach to this issue, see
SCHUCK, supra note 6, at 234-44.
106. Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1231-35.
107. In the Bendectin litigation, this evidence failed to demonstrate general causation. See
Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 897 F.2d 1159, 1160-62 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Richardson v. Rich-
ardson-Merrell, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 799, 803 (D.C. Cir. 1986), affd, 857 F.2d 823, 831-32 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
108. See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1137 (2d Cir. 1995);
Grimes v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 33 (D.N.H. 1995); Ambrosini v. Upjohn Co.,
1995 WL 637650, at *8 (D.D.C. 1995); cf. Sanderson v. International Flavors & Fragrances, Inc.,
950 F. Supp. 981, 1002 (C.D. Cal. 1996); Mascarenas v. Miles, 968 F. Supp. 582 (W.D. Mo. 1997);
Nelson v. American Sterilizer Co., 566 N.W.2d 671, 673-76 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
On the other hand, some courts have seemed to reject this categorical evidentiary rule, admit-
ting non-epidemiological evidence, at least in situations in which no epidemiological studies were
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IV. COMPLEXITY EXCEPTION TO THE RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL?
The technical character of much contemporary litigation has led
some commentators to call for the recognition of a complexity excep-
tion to the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial in certain types of
civil cases in which ordinary lay jurors, selected in the customary man-
ner, are deemed not competent to decide some of the factual issues
presented to them. 0 9 Although a number of courts have rejected this
argument, 110 one circuit court has suggested that such an exception
may derive from the Due Process Clause, not the Seventh Amend-
ment."' The Supreme Court, however, has not accepted this sugges-
tion. Were the Court to recognize such an exception," 2 it could
conceivably apply it to mass tort litigation, given the centrality of com-
plex, controversial scientific evidence to the resolution of causation,
market share liability, and other issues.
I do not propose to take any position here on the desirability, much
less the constitutionality, of a complexity exception in general or on
the appropriateness of applying this exception (were the Court to rec-
ognize one) to mass torts in particular. For now, I am agnostic on
both questions. Nevertheless, I confess to a certain initial skepticism
about the wisdom of such a reform, even before considering the im-
plementing detail that might enable one to assess how such an excep-
tion would actually work in practice. At this point, I simply want to
raise briefly some questions that ought be be asked (and hopefully
answered) before one takes a position on the merits of this question.
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quire, epidemiological evidence. E.g., Benedi v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 66 F.3d 1378, 1384-85 (4th
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JUDICIAL AVOIDANCE OF JURIES
First, are mass toxic torts any more complex than many other kinds
of litigation that are tried to juries? Antitrust litigation, for example,
involves evidence concerning market definition, market shares, and a
host of other highly technical questions of economic theory and effects
on competition and prices. Securities litigation often involves a long
chain of intricate commercial and financial transactions, comprehen-
sion of which requires immersion in arcane terminology, practices,
and concepts. The same is true of some white collar crime prosecu-
tions under RICO. Patent litigation is also technically demanding, 1 3
as are medical malpractice cases and litigation involving engineering
issues. In short, it is not at all clear that the kind of evidence with
which juries must grapple in mass tort cases is any more daunting than
the kinds of evidence presented in these other areas of litigation in
which juries are routinely used.
Second, how does the growing corpus of empirical research on jury
comprehension-much of it conducted by participants in this sympo-
sium-bear on this question? The type of litigation studied in this
literature that seems most analogous to mass tort cases is probably
medical malpractice, which often involves conflicting evidence by
scientists, some of it quite technical and statistical. Work by Neil Vid-
mar, Valerie Hans, and other researchers, however, suggests a high
degree of juror comprehension of the evidence in such cases.114 On
the other hand, the evidence in malpractice cases may be more easily
understood than in mass tort cases because jurors can often look to
testimony on standard medical practice as a kind of benchmark
against which the defendant's conduct can be evaluated, whereas such
benchmarks may be less readily available to prove product defect in
mass tort cases. Even the scientific evidence bearing on causation
may be more accessible in malpractice cases, as it too is likely to de-
pend on clinical testimony of a more familiar kind.
A third question concerns the extent to which scientific evidence
can be made more comprehensible to jurors through reforms in the
trial process. Reformers have long recommended certain adjustments
in traditional trial practice designed to facilitate juror comprehension,
especially in long trials. Some of these proposed changes would per-
mit jurors to take notes, bring them home with them, and put ques-
tions to the lawyers (through the judge). Others would allow the
113. See, e.g., id. at 1393-96 (discussing cognate issue).
114. Joe S. Cecil et al., Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Lessons from Civil Jury, 40
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judge to instruct the jury on general rules of law at the outset of the
case and not just at the end, provide the instructions in writing, display
documents in evidence on a computer screen or overhead that the jury
can view and retrieve, and so forth. Studies are needed of the effects
of such innovations on jury comprehension.
Fourth, can trial lawyers acquire-or do many of them already pos-
sess-the forensic skills to humanize and simplify even the most tech-
nical scientific evidence so as to make it intelligible to the lay juror? If
so, special juries are unnecessary. After all, bringing evidence down
to the jurors' level is preeminently the trial lawyer's job; it is what they
are trained to do effectively. Some lawyers are better at this than
others, of course, but that kind of skill inequality also affects many
other aspects of lawyers' performance in all kinds of cases; it is not
peculiar to the task of presenting complex evidence.
Finally, which fact-finder would replace the lay jury under a com-
plexity exception for mass tort cases, how would it be selected, and
would it be superior to the jury? These are difficult questions, espe-
cially since any new fact-finding institution will probably entail some
characteristic disadvantages as well as advantages. Consider, for ex-
ample, replacing the jury with a single judge who, although probably
scientifically untrained, might be more sophisticated in the evaluation
of expert testimony because the judge is more familiar with it. On the
other hand, however, the variance around a "true" finding of fact is
likely to be greater for a single judge than for a jury of twelve (or even
six) individuals, whose biases would tend to balance and neutralize
each other. 115 By the same token, a blue-ribbon jury of technically
trained experts, which some commentators have proposed,1 6 would
surely exhibit their own kinds of "trained incapacities." 117 I am not
suggesting that no improvements over the lay jury as fact-finder in
mass tort cases are possible," 8 but only that assessing whether a par-
ticular change does indeed constitute an improvement may ultimately
be as much a normative question (deciding which of the alternative
sets of tradeoffs is best on balance) as it is an empirical one that "legal
science" can answer.
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118. See Hannaford et al., supra note 9, at 259-63.
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